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This work analyses how the leverage ratio behaves through the cycle, vis-à-vis other 
capital ratios. For a sample of the largest Portuguese banks, the Basel III leverage ratio 
is indeed countercyclical. This result is relevant from a regulatory perspective, since the 
introduction of a limit on the leverage ratio will function as a restriction in the banks’ 
balance sheet size, reducing the economic costs associ ted with the excessive growth of 
leverage in periods of economic expansion followed by aggressive deleveraging in the 
downturn. However, one cannot exclude that restrictions on banks’ leverage incentivize 
its transference to less regulated intermediaries.  
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1. Introduction 
The basic concept underlying financial theory is that risk and expected return move 
together, which is to say, in an efficient market you can only expect more return if you 
take more risk.  
Leverage, however, can mask the relationship between risk and return, in particular 
for banks, which typically hold only a relatively small portion of capital relative to 
assets. In fact, the banking sector has benefited from implicit public guarantees, not 
only regarding deposits but also against failure altogether, in particular banks that are 
regarded as “too big to fail”2. As a consequence of these implicit guarantees, banks have 
benefited from the upside of risk (return) while tax payers have borne the down side, 
leading to a classic moral hazard situation and an incentive for excessive risk taking 
(Adrian and Shin, 2008).  
As a matter of fact, banks have historically operated with low levels of capital vis-à-
vis assets (Admati et. al., 2013), despite being one f the most regulated industries. 
Furthermore, research conducted in ten European coutries shows that capital to asset 
ratios have been on a long-term decline (Benink and Benston, 2005). Starting with 
around 30% capital in 1850-1880, the average ratio declined to about 15% in 1915-
1933, 7.5% in 1945, 5-6% through 2001, and around 3% just before the financial crisis. 
This structural decline in capital levels has been attributed to factors such as looser 
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 The term "too big to fail" is generally used in a broad sense. Clearly, being too big is a major part of the 
problem, but it is not all just about size. Excessive interconnectedness of financial institutions, reliance on 
a single or few firms for the provision of key financial infrastructure, and complexity of operations and 
cross-border activity are all part of what is referred to as "too big to fail". In combination, all these 
characteristics of a financial institution raise thimpact of its failure on the financial system, and thereby 
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regulation, the increase in implicit guarantees from the government, higher cost of 
capital, the role played by large banks and increases in diversification3. 
The financial crisis which started in 2007 and its enormous economic consequences 
have fuelled the discussion about the reliability of the pre-crisis regulatory framework, 
largely based on risk weighted capital requirements. Moreover, it should be noted that 
risk weights are dependent of general economic conditi s and, as a consequence, are 
subject to cyclical fluctuations (Daníelsson 2001). 
In this vein, among a large set of reforms, the Basel Committee of Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) is considering the introduction of a simple, risk-insensitive capital 
requirement, the leverage ratio (LR), which is regaded as a backstop measure to the 
risk weighted capital requirements and a guard against the build-up of excessive 
leverage, a key cause of the global financial crisis (BCBS, 2014). 
Nevertheless, the leverage ratio also has its own drawbacks; most importantly, the 
leverage ratio is insensitive to assessments of the riskiness of different assets and used 
on its own can incentivize banks to arbitrage regulation by taking on riskier assets. It 
can also have unintended consequences in inducing a shift of activities with low 
measured risk to less regulated sectors (Acharya et l., 2012). Some research also 
suggests that bank portfolios could become more similar to one another and therefore 
more correlated, which could undermine financial stbility, unless model risk is low or 
leverage requirements sufficiently high (Kiema and Jokivuolle, 2014). 
                                                                        
3
 Portfolio diversification implies a reduction of risk-weighted capital requirements, as the correlation 
between asset returns is usually less than one. However, it should be noted that during financial crises 
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The present definition of the leverage ratio includes total assets; derivatives; 
securities financing transactions and off balance sh et items in the denominator and 
Tier14 capital as numerator. 
The main purpose of this work is to assess whether, in the case of the Portuguese 
banking sector, the Basel III LR is a countercyclical apital requirement. It also assesses 
whether it is more countercyclical than the accounting leverage (Tier/Assets) and the 
risk weighted ratio (Tier1/Risk weighted assets), in the sense that it is a tighter 
constraint in booms and a looser constraint in recessions. 
It should be noted that, for the purpose of this work, pro-cyclicality refers to the 
mutually reinforcing mechanisms between the financial and real sectors of the 
economy which tend to amplify business cycle fluctuations and cause or exacerbate 
financial instability (Financial Stability Forum, 2009). Hence, if the leverage ratio is a 
countercyclical capital requirement, the ratio is expected to decrease as the cycle 
variable increases and vice-versa. 
The model detailed in section 4 compares the behaviour of different capital ratios 
along the business cycle. These ratios have the sam nu erator (Tier 1) and different 
denominators (risk weighted assets, total assets and the BCBS leverage exposure 
measure) and several cycle measures were also tested (nominal GDP, real GDP and the 
credit-to-GDP gap) in order to have a comparable conclusion. 
Nonetheless, the extensive literature summarized in section 3 mainly focus on the 
relationship between banks assets and their leverage. Moreover, the leverage is usually 
measured as the ratio of assets over capital, excluding some components of the BCBS 
LR. 
                                                                        
4 Tier 1 capital includes common equity, subordinated d bt and hybrid debt, which can be converted into 
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The remainder of the work is structured as follows: section 2 presents a brief 
overview of the regulatory framework; section 3 comprises the literature review; the 
model, the empirical specification and the results obtained for the larger Portuguese 
banks are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Regulatory framework 
The objective of the regulatory capital framework is to ensure that there is sufficient 
capital for banks to absorb unexpected losses and co tinue lending in a stress (BCBS, 
2010).  
This framework has evolved from a simplified Basel I approach, with few risk 
buckets, to a Basel II, 2.5 and III, increasingly more complex and risk sensitive  
(Haldane and Madouros, 2012), largely based on banks’ i ternal models5. Regardless of 
this increasing sophistication, banks have continued to fail and in the recent financial 
crisis, the amount of public support has been paramount, as well as the costs for the 
non-financial sectors, which have not yet fully recovered. According to Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009), banking crises are associated with profound declines in output and 
employment6.  
In the aftermath of the financial crisis that started in 2007, the regulatory reform has 
targeted the insufficiencies in regulation and supervision that were brought to light, 
since banks whose (risk weighted) capital ratios were well above minimum 
requirements collapsed, leading to public support or outright failure.  
                                                                        
5 It should be noted that there was no effective intrnational standard, since the degree of implementatio  
of Basel II varied across jurisdictions and national supervisory authorities had a reasonable degree of 
discretion. 
6 The unemployment rate rises an average of 7 percentag  points over the down phase of the cycle, which 
lasts on average over four years. Output falls an average of over 9 percent, although the duration of the 
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Furthermore, this financial crisis also highlighted that assessing the solvability of 
individual institutions is not a sufficient condition to financial system stability, albeit it 
is an essential one. In fact, problems arising in one institution can easily spread to other 
institutions or to the whole system via interconnectedness or common exposures, 
alongside with liquidity drying in financial markets, which is the modern equivalent of a 
bank run (BCBS, 2010). The possibility of such occurrence is usually referred to as 
“systemic risk”7. 
The “lessons from the crisis” include, among other v y relevant conclusions, the 
statement that there is a strong relation between risk-weighted capital requirements and 
the business cycle. Since internal models reflect pas realizations of default rates (PD) 
and losses (LGD), in “good times the estimated losses and, consequently, capital 
requirements tend to be low”, in particular after a period of reduced volatility (Adrian 
and Shin, 2010). Additionally, since severe financil risis are relatively rare and the 
models incorporate only a limited number of observations past crises tend not to be 
reflected in estimates of future losses (short term bias)8. Moreover, there is a lag 
between the occurrence of facts that influence PD and LGD and the correspondent 
incorporation in those estimates. 
The introduction of a simple, risk-insensitive capit l requirement, the LR, which is 
not subject to the same cyclical fluctuations of risk weighted capital requirements, is 
regarded as a backstop measure to the latest and a guard against the build-up of 
excessive leverage, a key cause of the global financ al crisis (BCBS, 2010).  
                                                                        
7 Article 2- c) of Regulation (EU) 1092/2010 defines systemic risk as “a risk of disruption in the financial 
system with the potential to have serious negative consequences for the internal market and the real 
economy”.  
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In particular, as risk weighting relies on knowable and quantifiable risks, there is a 
possibility that the assumptions underlying banks’ ri k models or the standardized 
approach are not satisfied in the real world. Uncertainty and the possibility of structural 
breaks mean that the distributions of PD and LGD might not be fully known for certain 
types of exposures. Dermine (2014) shows that the LR limits the risk of a bank run 
when there is imperfect information on the value of a bank’s assets. Similarly, models 
are simplifications of the real world and the ways in which they are simplified may lead 
to mis-calibration (Daníelsson 2001). In this sense, th  LR can help to protect against 
‘unknown unknowns’, the proverbial black swan in the tail of the probability 
distribution. 
In January 2014, the BCBS published the present definition of the leverage ratio. 
According to this definition, the capital measure is Tier 1 and the exposure measure 
comprises (i) on-balance sheet assets (excluding fiancial derivatives and securities 
financing transactions (SFT)9); (ii) off-balance sheet items (OBS) weighted according to 
the respective probability of being converted into on-balance sheet assets; (iii) financial 
derivatives, including the potential future exposure and (iv) SFT, comprising the 
counterparty credit risk. Netting between assets and liabilities is not permitted and risk 
mitigants (like collateral) are disregarded. 
Although this definition of the LR is not yet final10 and the eventual requirement of a 
minimum LR will only be decided in 2017, with a view to an eventual migration to 
                                                                        
9
 SFT, usually referred to as repo-like transactions, include repos, reverse repos and securities lending. 
10
 The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) published a framework for the leverage ratio in 
January 2014, which is deemed nearly final (BCBS, 2014). At European level, the EU Regulation 575/2013 
requires a final report from the European Banking Supervision Authority (EBA) to support the European 
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Pillar I requirement in 2018, the impact assessment exercise has started in 2010, with a 
minimum reference level of 3%. 
 
3. Literature Review 
Most empirical studies conclude that bank leverage is pro-cyclical regarding banks’ 
assets, in particular for determined business models [investment banks (Adrian and 
Shin, 2008 and Baglioni et al., 2011) or banks especially involved in securitizations 
(Becalli et. al., 2014)] or large banks (Kalemli-Ozcan et. al., 2012). 
The papers by Adrian and Shin (2008, 2010, 2013) study he cyclical behaviour of 
American banks balance sheet leverage. Their work is considered seminal and has been 
commonly used as a benchmark. Adrian and Shin (2008) shows that leverage (defined 
as assets/capital) is countercyclical for households, a-cyclical for commercial banks and 
pro-cyclical for investment banks. 
For these investment banks, who keep mainly marked to market balance sheets, the 
authors conclude that the main determinant of leverag  is their borrowing conditions, 
namely the haircuts on repo transactions. Additionally, the authors find a link between 
financial intermediaries’ balance sheet management and the markets’ perception of 
aggregate risk, measured by volatility11. When market asset prices rise and aggregate 
perception of risk is low, financing conditions are favourable and banks expand their 
balance sheets, mostly with recourse to very short term debt. The rate of growth of the 
aggregate financial sector balance sheets can be und rstood as the supply of aggregate 
liquidity; hence, the individual balance sheet management of financial intermediaries 
translates into credit growth (as more borrowers get cr dit when the banks’ balance 
sheet expands) and credit crunches (when financial intermediaries need do reduce their 
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balance sheet size). As a consequence, there are negative externalities from this profit 
seeking individual behaviour. 
In Adrian and Shin (2013), the link between the value-at-risk (VaR) per unit of 
capital disclosed by banks and their leverage fluctuations is explored. Since VAR is 
determined for a given probability of failure (usually 1%), a capital stock and the 
underlying characteristics of assets (volatility, correlations), leverage behaviour can be 
mimicked assuming that financial intermediaries tryo maintain this probability 
constant, perhaps in order to keep external ratings and creditworthiness. Hence, when 
volatility is low, the VaR per unit of assets (“unit VAR”) decreases and banks have 
“space” to grow their balance sheets. They do so by increasing their short term 
financing (repos, hedge funds cash management) and applications (reverse repos). It 
should also be noticed that the “unit VAR” can be interpreted as the required capital for 
banks per unit of asset, which corresponds to the medium risk weight in solvency 
regulation. 
The “unit VaR” and stock options implied volatility are both measures of firm risk, 
except that, while the unit VaR is the firms’ own assessment of risk, implied volatility is 
the market’s assessment of equity risk. The authors refer a time lag of about 6 months 
between the pike in implied volatility and the pike in unit VaR during the financial 
crisis, given the backward-looking nature of the VaR ( nd risk weights) estimates.  
Since the supply of credit increases, riskier projects get financing. This dynamic is 
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banks’ shareholders get only the upside of increasing r sk taking and thus have an 
incentive for this behaviour12. 
Baglioni et al. (2011) build on Adrian and Shin (2008) analysis, while investigating a 
sample of 77 major European banks (the Stoxx600 banks index) from 2000 to 2009. In 
Europe, the predominant type of bank is “universal”; hence the authors have 
distinguished “investment banks” and “commercial banks” by using the median ratio 
between interest income and net revenues (56%). Banks were classified as “commercial 
banks” if their ratio was above median. The authors c nclude that (mainly) “investment 
banks” respond to a change in their assets value by changing leverage in the same 
direction, that is, leverage is pro-cyclical, which onfirms Adrian and Shin (2008) 
results. 
Becalli et. al. (2014) focus on the influence of off balance sheet items (in particular 
securitization) on leverage, building a measure of “effective leverage” that includes off-
balance sheet securitizations, which compares with “formal” leverage (on balance sheet 
assets). Among other findings, the authors conclude that formal leverage underestimates 
effective leverage, and that not only investment baks but also commercial banks which 
are more involved in securitization have procyclical leverage. It should be noted that 
this is an approach to the present BCBS of the leverage exposure measure, since off 
balance sheet commitments are included in this exposure. 
Galo and Thomas (2013) use a general equilibrium model t  explore the relationship 
between bank leverage, GDP and capital and conclude that the volatility and pro-
cyclicality of leverage can be understood as the result of the interplay between 
collateralized bank debt, moral hazard and changes in uncertainty. Since a significant 
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 Merton (1973) derives the same conclusion by using option pricing to the value of an enterprise with 
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share of banks’ liabilities has limited liability, banks enjoy the upside risk in their 
assets, leaving the institutional investors to bear downsize, which is a classic moral 
hazard problem that induces banks to increase their debt and invest in riskier assets. In 
order to induce each bank to invest efficiently, investors monitor banks’ leverage ratios. 
If the uncertainty regarding banks’ assets returns increases, banks have an incentive to 
invest in riskier projects and investors will require a lower target leverage in order to 
prevent them from doing so. This deleveraging forces banks to contract their balance 
sheets leading to a fall in intermediated credit. 
Fostel and Geanakoplos (2013) summarize several researches on the leverage cycle 
developed using a general equilibrium model is based in the relationship between 
leverage and collateral, since leverage can be obtained as the inverse of the haircut on 
collateral (for repo-like transactions). Volatility is a proxy for the fear of default and 
haircuts applied to the collateral are dependant of his perception of risk. Hence, 
fluctuations in volatility (like in the VIX index) can trigger adjustments in leverage. As 
in Adrian and Shin (2008), the conditions of credit to financial intermediaries determine 
their leverage. Authors conclude that the demand for collateral can origin bubbles in 
asset prices, which reinforce the leverage cycle, which is up when volatility is low, 
hence, in determined conditions, leverage can be determined endogenously. 
The paper by Brei and Gambacorta (2014) is the first empirical investigation on how 
the new LR behaves over the cycle. The paper establishes an empirical framework to 
compare the cyclical properties of different capital r tios. Given this empirical 
specification, the authors conclude that the Basel III LR is significantly more 
countercyclical than the RW capital ratio: it is a tighter constraint in booms and a looser 
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measure definition which determine a different sensitivity to the cycle, it concludes that 
off-balance sheet items (OFS), like guarantees and other elements (credit lines, 
acceptances and items related to securitizations), are the items that give origin to the 
more procyclical behaviour of the Basel III exposure measure, which is in line with 
Becalli et. al. (2014) and their findings regarding the inclusion of securitizations in the 
“effective leverage”. The authors also conclude that results are different in “normal 
times” as compared with the crisis period, specifically; all capital ratios tend to be less 
countercyclical (more procyclical) during the crisis period. This might be explained by 
the reduced correlation of the denominator (which includes lending) with the cycle 
measures associated with the recognition of crisis-elated losses or banks’ need to 
deleverage resulting from debt-overhang. 
The cyclicality of capital, on the other hand, has been less studied and appears to be 
a-cyclical, at least during expansions, which means that banks do not accumulate capital 
in “good times” (Brei and Gambacorta, 2014). 
The empirical specification used in this work adapts the model used in Brei and 
Gambacorta (2014) to the Portuguese banking sector and assesses whether the authors’ 
results hold. 
 
4. Empirical Specification 
Brei and Gambacorta (201) analyses how the Basel III LR (Tier I Capital/Exposure) 
behaves over the cycle and it proposes a setup to tes  for the cyclical properties of 
several bank capital ratios: i) The Basel III LR (Tier I Capital/Basel III Exposure); ii) 
The accounting leverage ratio (Tier I Capital/Total Assets); and iii) The capital-to-risk-
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were considered, namely, (a) the annual growth rate of nominal GDP (expressed in 
national currency); (b) The annual growth rate of real GDP; and (c) The credit-to-GDP 
gap (the difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio nd its trend). The empirical 
specification follows Ayuso et al. (2004) and can be derived from a model in which a 
representative bank minimizes its intertemporal costs f capital.  
The dynamic panel regression, broken down by bank, is designed to test how the 
different capital ratios correlate to the cycle: 
 =	 + 	 + 






The dependent variable, L	 is the capital ratio in year t, of bank i. As mentio ed 
above three capital ratios are tested: the Basel III Leverage; the accounting leverage 
ratio and the capital-to-risk-weighted-assets ratio (Tier 1/Risk-weighted assets); α	 is a 
bank-specific constant which measures time invariant fixed effects;	C is a dummy 
variable that accounts for the crisis period, as well as for the beginning of the 
adjustment towards the new regulatory standards – in Portugal, the dummy has been 
attributed a value of 1 from the last quarter of 2008 until the first quarter of 2014, since 
the crisis was prolonged by the sovereign debt crisis. The inclusion of L	 
acknowledges the persistence in capital ratios, that is to say, the existence of short term 
adjustment costs. Y	is the cycle explanatory variable.  
As stated above, three cycle variables are being considered, namely, the annual 
growth rate of nominal GDP (expressed in national currency); the annual growth rate of 
real GDP; and the credit-to-GDP gap. The first two are business cycle measures, while 
the last one is a financial cycle proxy. 
X is a vector of bank-specific control variables, which are typically used in 
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by the log of total assets; bank’s provisions over loans (P	) measure the relative 
riskiness of the bank and the return on assets ( ROA ) measures the direct cost of 
remunerating capital. 
Hence, if the leverage ratio is a countercyclical capital requirement the results will 
yield a negative value for 	" . As a consequence, when the nominal GDP has positive 
growth rates, the leverage ratio will decrease and may become binding, thus requiring 
the bank to decrease its leverage exposure or increase its capital.   
Additionally, if it is the more countercyclical of the capital ratios being tested, 
χ$%&/(%)%&*+%	,-./01&% <	χ$%&/$/*3		400%0 <	χ$%&/564, which means that the 
leverage ratio is more sensible to the cycle, thus being the first capital requirements to 
signal the need for corrective action from the bank. I  this sense, it would be the a 
tighter constraint in booms and a looser constraint in recessions 
Finally, the effect of the crisis and innovation in banks’ regulation is also tested (by 
testing the statistical significance of "∗0). 
One possible identification problem is endogeneity, originated either from 
misspecification of the model (omitted variables) or fr m simultaneity among variables, 
since the state of the banking sector could also affect the business cycle and the credit 
cycle. 
To minor the first effect, the estimator that is used – the dynamic System Generalized 
Method of Moments (S-GMM), is intended to reduce endogenity bias and takes into 
account the heterogeneity in the data caused by unobservable factors affecting 
individual banks. Hence, the estimator comprises a two-steps approach using the model 
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In order address the second question, different lags of the endogenous variables are 
also used, since instrumental bank-specific characte istics are lagged by one year in 
order to mitigate the possible endogeneity problem. 
 
4.1. Data 
For the estimation of the empirical model, quarterly supervisory bank level data for 
Tier 1 capital, total assets, risk weighted assets, financial derivatives, securities 
financing transactions; off balance sheet items (guarantees and commitments), profits, 
total credit and provisions were used. When quarterly data is not available, linear 
interpolation of annual or semi-annual data was used. Observations cover the period 
from 2000Q4 to 2014Q1. The cut-off dates correspond t  the availability of consistent 
data in the beginning of the period and the choice f 2014Q1 precludes including the 
data break associated with the resolution measured applied to Banco Espiríto Santo, SA 
in August 2014. The exact availability of data is dclosed in Annex II, as well as the 
methodology used to estimate the exposure measure of th LR. 
Quarterly nominal and real GDP data are from the Nation l Statistics Institute (INE) 
and the series used refer to ESA 1995 methodology. The credit-to-GDP gap was 
obtained from internal estimates of the Banco de Portugal13. 
The sample includes the largest banking groups operating in Portugal, either 
regarding total assets or credit provisioning to the economy, namely, Caixa Geral de 
Depósitos (CGD); Banco BPI (BPI); Banco Comercial Português (BCP); Banco 
                                                                        
13
 The credit-to-GDP gaps are derived, in line with the Basel III guidelines for the countercyclical capital 
buffer, as the deviations of the credit-to-GDP ratios from their one-sided (real-time) long-term trend. 
The credit aggregate referred here is “credit to private non-financial sectors”. Trends are calculated 
using a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing factor lambda of 400,000, taking account only 
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Espírito Santo (ES); Banco Santander Totta (BST) e Caixa Económica Montepio Geral 
(CEMG). Despite its relevance to the Portuguese banking sector, Banco Internacional 
do Funchal (BANIF) was excluded from the sample, due to extreme variations in capital 
ratios that could not be attributable to cyclical effects. 
Table 1 presents a summary characterization of the main variables, namely, capital 
ratios and business cycle measures. It can be observed that nominal and real GDP 
growth rates during the crisis period were negative (-0.002;-0.003), while all the capital 
ratios present a higher average during this period. It should also be noted that the credit 
gap depicts a negative mean during the crisis, revealing the tightening of credit supply 
to the economy.  








Capital Ratios Cycle Variables 
Tier 1/Leverage 
exposure 
0.053 0.011 0.030 0.082 Nominal GDP 
growth 




0,059 0,010 0,039 0,082 Nominal GDP 
growth – crisis 
- 0,002 0,011 - 0,022 0,014 
Tier1/ Total 
Assets 
0.056 0.011 0.034 0.086 Real GDP 
growth 
-0.000 0.008 -0.024 0.147 
Tier1/ Total 
Assets – Crisis 
0,064 0,010 0,044 0,086 Real GDP 
growth – crisis 
- 0,003 0,009 - 0,024 0,011 
Tier 1/Risk 
weighted assets 
0.086 0.021 0.050 0.162 Credit Gap (in 
differences) 




0,102 0,020 0,065 0,162 
Credit Gap (in 
differences) - 
crisis 
-  0.248 1,748 - 3,583 3,747 
 
4.2. The cyclicality of capital ratios 
The baseline results were derived from equation 1 for the different capit l ratios 
considered and the diverse economic cycle measures and the crisis dummy. Results for 
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the other cycle measures outcomes are presented in annex I. Additionally, the t-test on 
the difference in the mean between Tier/Exposure measur  and Tier1/Total assets 
indicates that the two capital measures are statistic lly different (the results for the t-test 
are also presented in annex 1). 
Table 2 – Baseline Results 





Tier 1/Total Assets Tier 1/RWA 
 






 L (t-1) + 0,8784*** 0,0213 0,8664*** 0,0223 0,9107*** 0,0183 
 L (t-1)*C + 0,8399*** 0,0402 0,8330*** 0,0408 0,9010*** 0,031 
Y (t) = Nominal GDP 
growth 
- -0,0322** 0,0190 -0,0308 0,0205 -0,0726*** 0,0308 
Y (t)*C - -0,0484* 0,0296 -0,0489 0,0311 -0,0676 0,0527 
C  0,0017*** 0,0004 0,0020*** 0,0005 0,0033*** 0,0008 
Constant  0,0061*** 0,0010 0,0072*** 0,0012 0,0075*** 0,0014 
All estimations are based on the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Bank fixed effects are not reported. 
 
By the observation of the table above, one can conclude that: 
(i) The LR varies in opposite relation with nominal GDP (χ$%&/,-. < 0, while 
this is not the case when considering the ratio Tier 1/Total Assets.  
(ii)  During the crisis period, only the leverage ratio coefficient is statistically 
different from zero and negative, indicating that the ratio is countercyclical 
(χ ∗$%&/,-.< 0. 
(iii)  Regarding the complete sample, the risk-weighted capital ratio is also 
countercyclical (χ$%&/564 < 0. and the associated coefficient is statistically 
significant. Additionally, the absolute value of the coefficient for the cycle variable 
(GDP nominal growth) is higher for this capital ratio than for the LR (-0.07 versus -
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This result can be explained by the fact that risk-weighted capital requirements are 
subject of regulatory constraints, which increased during the crisis (hence, TIER 
1/RWA increased while nominal GDP presented negative growth rates) leading to a 
countercyclical behaviour. This is a classical case for the Lucas critique, since we are 
observing a variable which is subject to policy restrictions. By contrast, the LR was 
not subject to restrictions or close monitoring. 
Additionally, Portuguese banks have changed their balance sheet composition, 
moving away from assets with non-zero risk weights towards sovereign debt (with an 
associated zero risk weight). Hence, leverage exposure growth has been more 
pronounced than risk weighted assets increase, as can be observed in graph 1. Once 
again, this was possible because leverage is not regulat d and, furthermore, no bank 
in the sample would fail the 3% threshold which has been tested in Basel II 
quantitative impact assessment (as is depicted in table 1). 
Graph 1 – Leverage exposure measure and risk weighted assets 
 
(iv) All the capital ratios are time persistent. As a matter of fact, 0.87 of the LR in a 
given period can be explained by its value in the previous quarter. The coefficient 
for the risk weighted capital ratio in even higher (0.91). 
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(v)  It should also be noticed that the coefficients for the crisis dummy are always 
statistically different from zero and positive. This can be explained by increased 
capital requirements during the post-2008 period, which translate in a 0.002 
coefficient for the LR and a 0.004 coefficient for the RWA ratio. 
(vi)  Coefficients for the real GDP growth as cycle measure are not statistically 
different from zero for all the capital ratios and the coefficients for the credit gap 
are all very close to zero. These results are present d in annex I. 
As can be observed in table 3, the inclusion of bank specific characteristics does not 
change the main conclusions presented above. This can be interpreted as a similitude 
between the business models of the several banks in the sample, which indeed are all 
universal banks, despite differences in the total sh re of the market and even in risk 
taking and balance sheet composition. 
It should also be highlighted that the size coefficient is not statistically different from 
zero for the complete sample, hence one can assume that the “too big too fail” subsidy 
is independent of the bank size or that it is not relevant. On the other hand, in the crisis 
period this coefficient becomes statistically significant for all the business cycle 
measures, perhaps due to greater scrutiny and requirements by the supervisor 
concerning larger banks, which were also recapitalized, either with public (BCP, CGD 
and BPI) or private capital (ES). Additionally, it can be argued out that the implicit 
public subsidies are bigger during crises, when the likelihood of failure increases. 
When using the real GDP growth as the cycle variable coefficients for the cycle 
measure are still not statistically significant but coefficients associated with bank 





Is the Basel III leverage ratio countercyclical? 
A study for Portuguese banks 
Table 3 – Controlling for bank specific characteristics 




Tier 1/Total Assets Tier 1/RWA 
   
Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. 
Std. 
err 
 L (t-1) + 0,8652*** 0,0237 0,8479*** 0,0248 0,8926*** 0,0208 
 L (t-1)*C + 0,7757*** 0,0512 0,7394*** 0,0551 0,8641*** 0,0411 
Y (t) = Nominal GDP 
growth 
- -0,0327* 0,0190 -0,0288 0,0205 -0,0718** 0,0309 
Y (t)*C - -0,0427 0,0294 -0,0362 0,0309 -0,0577 0,0533 
C  0,0015** 0,0005 0,0016*** 0,0006 0,0036*** 0,0009 
Size (t-1)  0,0008 0,0005 0,0013 0,0006 -0,0007 0,0009 
Size (t-1)*C  0,4668*** 0,1915 0,1167*** 0,0360 0,1036* 0,0605 
ROA(t-1)  0,2673** 0,1208 0,2996 0,1303 -0,0074 0,1904 
ROA(t-1)*C  0,0831*** 0,0323 0,0012 0,0012 0,0017 0,0021 
%Prov. (t-1)  0,0340** 0,0161 0,0439*** 0,0177 0,0384 0,0269 
%Prov. (t-1)*C  0,0049 0,0131 -0,0004 0,0137 -0,0069 0,0238 
Constant  -0,0027 0,0059 -0,0070 0,0062 0,0150 0,0099 
All estimations are based on the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator. ***, **, *indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Bank fixed effects are not reported. 
 
4.3. The cyclicality of the components of the capital ratios 
A capital ratio can change by altering either the numerator or the denominator, hence 
it is relevant to analyse separately the cyclical behaviour of the numerator (Tier 1) and 
the denominators (leverage exposure, total assets and risk weighted assets). The 
specification of the model is the same as the one in section 4.1, with minor adaptations. 
Since the logarithmic transformation did not yield stationary variables, differences were 
used in order to avoid spurious regressions, corresponding to these variables growth 
rates. 
Table 4 depicts the results for the baseline regression. It can be observed that Tier1 
coefficients depict a negative sign, leading to the conclusion that capital is 
countercyclical, including in the crisis period, when more demanding regulatory 
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reform addresses this undesirable effect by imposing a countercyclical capital buffer, 
which is constituted in the upswing and can be deplet d during downturns14. 
Results for the leverage exposure and total assets ar  tatistically significant for the 
crisis period, during which they show a countercycli al pattern, while when considering 
the complete sample period, the sign of the corresponding coefficients signal procyclical 
behaviour. Risk weighted assets are significantly procyclical when considering the 
entire sample period, but countercyclical during the crisis. 
Table 4 – Cyclicality of the components of the capit l ratios 
Dependent 







  Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. 
Std. 
err 
Coeff. Std. err 
 L (t-1) 0,9831*** 0,0087 0,9895*** 0,0055 0,9933*** 0,0058 1,0071*** 0,0038 
 L (t-1)*C 0,9834*** 0,0178 0,0552*** 0,0048 0,0480*** 0,0040 0,0670*** 0,0059 
Y (t) = 
Nominal 
GDP growth 
-0,9433*** 0,3197 0,1439 0,1731 0,1628 0,1799 0,3832*** 0,1234 
Y (t)*C -1,0157** 0,5187 -1,6865*** 0,4602 -0,7553** 0,3718 -0,3004 0,5142 
C -0,0068 0,0086 0,1852 0,0511 -0,0084** 0,0042 -0,0245*** 0,0027 
Constant 0,1524** 0,0641 0,0000 0,0000 0,0849 0,0605 -0,0555 0,0383 
All estimations are based on the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Bank fixed effects are not reported. 
 
Using the credit gap as the cycle variable yields differentiated results, since all 
components are pro-cyclical and the coefficients are statistically significant. 
 
4.4. The cyclicality of the leverage exposure components 
Since the leverage ratio exposure measure builds on total balance sheet assets, while 
including additional components that increase the risk of eventual excessive leverage, 
namely, the potential future exposure of derivative contracts, the counterparty credit risk 
of securities financing transactions (SFT) and the conversion of off-balance sheet items 
                                                                        
14
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(OBS), guarantees and commitments, into on balance she t components it is relevant to 
consider each one specific contribution to the cycli ality of the exposure measure (and 
the leverage ratio). The results of an econometric specification analogous to the one 
presented in section 4.3 are presented in table 5. 
It can be observed that the only component that exhibits a procyclical pattern is OBS, 
which is positive and statistically different from zero. This component also shows a 
countercyclical behaviour during the crisis, perhaps due to the conversion of banks’ 
commitments and guarantees or to more risk aversion from the banks when entering 
into these operations. 
The derivatives and SFT components do not present statistically significant 
coefficients. 
Table 5 – Cyclicality of the components of the leverage exposure 
Dependent 
variable L (t) Derivatives (growth)« SFT (growth) OBS (growth) 
  Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err 
 L (t-1) 0,9845*** 0,0145 0,7489*** 0,0685 0,9427*** 0,0118 
 L (t-1)*C 1,0444*** 0,0237 0,6572*** 0,0737 0,3712*** 0,0319 
Y (t) = Nominal 
GDP growth -2,6729 3,7162 8,9063 8,5639 1,2628* 0,7472 
Y (t)*C 1,0387 5,5350 9,1697 7,9137 -0,9226 2,4175 
C -0,1979** 0,0858 -0,3446 0,6191 5,0400** 0,2488 
Constant 0,1776** 0,0842 1,3905** 0,7153 0,0000*** 0,0000 
All estimations are based on the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Bank fixed effects are not reported. 
 
Since this work follows the study conducted in Brei and Gambacorta (2014), results 
can be compared with this benchmark. Several aspects can be pointed out: 
(i) In both studies, capital ratios present a high degre  of time persistency, which 
can be explained by adjustment costs, in particular when issuing additional capital. 
(ii)  In both studies, the Basel II leverage ratio is countercyclical, as well as the 
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Portuguese case the LR is not more countercyclical than the risk weighted assets 
ratio. This result may be explained by the particular adjustment process that the 
Portuguese banking system undertook in recent years, as well as by historically low 
risk weighted capital ratios and relatively high average risk weights.  
(iii)  In both studies, the leverage exposure and total assets are counter-cyclical during 
the crisis period. On the other hand, Tier 1 is pro-cyclical in Grei and Gambacort 
(2014), while countercyclical for the Portuguese banking sector. This result can be 
explained by the capitalisation effort that has been undertaken in recent years, 
during which product growth was sluggish (in Portugal). 
(iv)  In both studies, off balance sheet items are the most pro-cyclical component of 
the Basel III leverage ratio exposure. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In an increasingly complex model of regulation, theleverage ratio is on the way of 
being introduced as a backstop measure to risk weighted capital ratios. At the present, 
some jurisdictions like Canada, United States Switzerland and the UK have already 
introduced a leverage restriction or recommendation v a national legislation. 
At international level, the BCBS is currently assessing the impact of introducing a 
3% minimum requirement, while at EU level the European Commission is expected to 
deliver a report on the calibration of a possible binding Pillar I requirement by 2018. 
Hence, the subject merits being studied, as it will condition the future behaviour of bank 
managers. 
The major part of the literature deals with cyclicality of bank leverage rather than the 
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bank leverage appears to behave cyclically because banks' assets and liabilities 
management decisions are mainly driven risk-adjusted regulatory capital adequacy 
requirements. When banks try to maintain a constant volume of risk-weighted assets 
through the cycle, bank leverage will vary with the cycle. In this context, a regulatory 
leverage ratio requirement may limit cyclicality of bank leverage. 
Brei and Gambacorta (2014), is the first empirical experiment that assesses the 
behaviour of the leverage ratio over the economic cycle. Portugal is not included in the 
authors’ sample; nevertheless, if the requirement is imposed by European regulation, 
Portuguese banks will also be subject to it. 
This work, in line with Brei and Gambacorta (2014), concludes that the leverage 
ratio is countercyclical. On the other hand, the results of this study do not convey that it 
is a tighter constraint in booms and a looser constraint in recessions that the risk 
weighted capital ratio. 
This can be explained by the adjustment process undertaken by the Portuguese 
banks, by their characteristic of universal banks or by the fact that the banks considered 
in the sample were not subject to a leverage restriction, but were subject to a risk 
weighted assets requirement. In this regard the Lucas critique applies concerning the 






Is the Basel III leverage ratio countercyclical? 
A study for Portuguese banks 
References 
Acharya, V., Mehran, H., Shuermann, T. and Thakor, A. (2012): Robust capital 
regulation, CEPR Discussion papers 8792. 
Admati, A. R., Demarzo, P. M., Hellwig, M. F., & Pfleiderer, P. (2011). Fallacies , 
Irrelevant Facts , and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation : Why Bank 
Equity is Not Expensive. Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on 
Collective Goods Bonn 2010/42. 
Adrian, T., & Shin, H. S. (2010). Liquidity and levrage. Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 19(3), 418–437.  
Adrian, T., & Shin, H. S.. (2010), The Changing Nature of Financial Intermediation and 
the Financial Crisis of 2007-09. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports 
(March).  
Adrian, T., & Shin, H. S. (2014). Procyclical leverage and value-at-risk. Review of 
Financial Studies, 27(2), 373–403. 
Aikman, D., Galesic, M., Gigerenzer, G., Kapadia, S., Katsikopoulos, K. V, Kothiyal, 
A., … Neumann, T. (2014). Taking uncertainty seriously: simplicity versus 
complexity in financial regulation. Bank of England Financial Stability Paper, 
(28). 
Ayuso, J., Pérez, D., & Saurina, J. (2004). Are capital buffers pro-cyclical? Evidence 
from Spanish panel data. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13(2), 249–264.  
Baglioni, a., Beccalli, E., Boitani, a., & Monticini, a. (2013). Is the leverage of 
European banks procyclical? Empirical Economics, 45(3), 1251–1266.  
Banca D'Italia, Financial sector pro-cyclicality (2009), Occasional papers, Questioni di 
Economi e Finanza, number 44. 
Beccalli, E., Boitani, A., & Di Giuliantonio, S. (2014). Leverage pro-cyclicality and 
securitization in US banking. Journal of Financial Intermediation.  
Brei, M., & Gambacorta, L. (2014). The leverage ratio over the cycle, (471). BIS 
Working Papers, No 471 (November). 
Cecchetti, S. (2011). How to cope with the too-big-to-fail problem? 10th Annual 
Conference of the International Association of Deposit Insurers, "Beyond the 
Crisis: The Need for a Strengthened Financial Stability Framework", Warsaw, 
Poland, 19 October 2011. 
Committee, B. (2014). Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III leverage 





Is the Basel III leverage ratio countercyclical? 
A study for Portuguese banks 
Committee, B. (2010). Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A global 
regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems 
Drehmann, M. (2013). Total credit as an early warning indicator for systemic banking 
crises, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, BIS Quarterly Review, June 
2013. 
Financial Stability Forum (2009). Report of the Financial Stability Forum on 
Addressing Procyclicality in the Financial System. 
Fostel, A., & Geanakoplos, J. D. (2013). Reviewing the Leverage Cycle. Annual Review 
of Economics. 
Galo, N.&Thomas, C. (2013). Bank Leverage Cycles, Banco de Espana, Working Paper 
No. 1222. 
Haldane, A. G., & Madouros, V. (2012). The dog and the frisbee. Federal Reserve Bank 
of Kansas City’s 36th Economic Policy Symposium, 1–36. 
Harald Benink and George Benston, “The Future of Banking Regulation in Developed 
Countries: Lessons from and for Europe,” Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Instruments 14, no. 5 (2005): 289–327. 
Kalemli-Ozcan, S., Sorensen, B., & Yesiltas, S. (2012). Leverage across firms, banks, 
and countries. Journal of International Economics, 88(2), 284–298.  
Kierma, I. and Jokivuole, E. (2014). Does a leverag ratio requirement increase bank 
stability?. Journal of Banking and Finance 02/2014, 39, pages 240-254. 
Merton, R., Theory of Rational Option Pricing. The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. 141-183. 
Regulation (EU) 1092/2010 of the European Parliament a d of the Council (24 
November 2010), on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial 
system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board. 
Regulation (Eu) No 575/2013 of The European Parliament and of The Council of 26 
June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms 
and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. 
Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. S. (2009). The Aftermath Of Financial Crises. National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Working paper series, No. 14656. 
 
 
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters 




ANNEX I: Results for alternative measures of the cycle variable 









Exposure Tier 1/Total Assets Tier 1/RWA  
Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err 
 L (t-1) + 0,8744*** 0,0212 0,8627*** 0,0222 0,9062*** 0,0183 
 L (t-1)*C + 0,8308*** 0,0401 0,8238*** 0,0407 0,8963*** 0,0314 
Y (t) = 
Real GDP 
growth 
- -0,0085 0,0203 -0,0107 0,0220 -0,0335 0,0332 
Y (t)*C - -0,0229 0,0357 -0,0239 0,0374 0.0188 0.7654 
C  0,0020*** 0,0004 0,0023 0,0004 0,0040*** 0,0007 
Constant  0,0060*** 0,0010 0,0071 0,0012 0,0072*** 0,0014 
All estimations are based on the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Bank fixed effects are not reported. 
 










Tier 1/Total Assets Tier 1/RWA  
Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err 
 L (t-1) + 0,8753*** 0,0212 0,8643*** 0,0222 0,9065*** 0,0183 
 L (t-1)*C + 0,8128*** 0,0460 0,7964*** 0,0483 0,8483*** 0,0412 
Y (t) = 
Credit 
Gap 
- 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000* 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Y (t)*C - -0,0001 0,0001 -0,0001 0,0001 -0,0003* 0,0002 
C  0,0012** 0,0007 0,0014** 0,0007 0,0032*** 0,0011 
Constant  0,0020 0,0027 0,0026 0,0029 0,0026 0,0043 
All estimations are based on the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator. ***, **, * indicate 
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Table 2a) Controlling for bank specific characteristics/Cycle variable = Real GDP growth 
Dependent 





Tier 1/Leverage Exposure Tier 1/Total Assets Tier 1/RWA  
Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err 
 L (t-1) + 0,8609*** 0,0236 0,8441*** 0,0247 0,8878*** 0,0209 
 L (t-1)*C + 0,7250*** 0,0542 0,2343*** 0,0192 0,8549*** 0,0408 
Y (t) = Real 
GDP growth 
- -0,0109 0,0204 -0,0123 0,0220 -0,0292 0,0332 
Y (t)*C - -0,0080 0,0368 0,0215 0,0225 0,0339 0,0631 
C  0,0018*** 0,0005 0,0019*** 0,0005 0,0042*** 0,0009 
Size (t-1)  0,0008 0,0005 0,0013** 0,0006 -0,0006 0,0009 
Size (t-1)*C  0,5751*** 0,2009 0,0033*** 0,0001 0,3625 0,3401 
ROA(t-1)  0,2596** 0,1213 0,2939** 0,1309 -0,0227 0,1922 
ROA(t-1)*C  0,1231*** 0,0359 1,0537*** 0,1300 0,1153* 0,0607 
%Prov. (t-1)  0,0349** 0,0162 0,0449*** 0,0177 0,0403 0,0272 
%Prov. (t-1)*C  0,0012 0,0012 0,3438* 0,0211 0,0017*** 0,0021 
Constant  -0,0031 0,0059 -0,0076 0,0062 0,0131 0,0099 
All estimations are based on the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Bank fixed effects are not reported. 
 
Table 2b) Controlling for bank specific characteristics/Cycle variable = = Credit Gap 






Tier 1/Total Assets Tier 1/RWA  
Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err 
 L (t-1) + 0,8495*** 0,0239 0,8349*** 0,0249 0,8782*** 0,0208 
 L (t-1)*C + 0,7640*** 0,0506 0,7279*** 0,0539 0,8399*** 0,0441 
Y (t) = Credit Gap - 0,0000** 0,0000 0,0000* 0,0000 0,0001*** 0,0000 
Y (t)*C - 0,0001*** 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 -0,0002 0,0002 
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Tier 1/Total Assets Tier 1/RWA  
Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err 
Size (t-1)  0,0003 0,0006 0,0009 0,0006 -0,0014 0,0010 
Size (t-1)*C  0,4675*** 0,1922 0,5892*** 0,2012 0,3614 0,3390 
ROA(t-1)  0,2412** 0,1199 0,2775** 0,1295 -0,0535 0,1901 
ROA(t-1)*C  0,1204*** 0,0431 0,1618*** 0,0467 0,0743 0,0727 
%Prov. (t-1)  0,0481** 0,0172 0,0583*** 0,0189 0,0640** 0,0284 
%Prov. (t-1)*C  0,0006 0,0011 0,0012 0,0012 0,0014 0,0021 
Constant  -0,0041 0,0059 -0,0086 0,0062 0,0108 0,0099 
All estimations are based on the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Bank fixed effects are not reported. 
 











Risk Weighted Assets 
(growth) 
Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err 
 L (t-1) 0,9634*** 0,0123 0,9794*** 0,0079 0,9788*** 0,0083 1,0006*** 0,0059 
 L (t-1)*C 0,9795*** 0,0180 0,0539*** 0,0047 0,0467*** 0,0039 0,0551*** 0,0049 
Y (t) = 
Real GDP 
growth 
-0,3889 0,3510 0,0632 0,1830 0,0803 0,1903 0,3903*** 0,1278 
Y (t)*C -0,5071 0,6375 -1,9132* 0,5359 -1,1488* 0,4381 -2,3243*** 0,5379 
C 0,0020 0,0081 -0,0099*** 0,0037 -0,0095** 0,0039 -0,0261*** 0,0025 
Constant 0,1485** 0,0648 0,1292** 0,0575 0,0887 0,0604 -0,0466 0,0385 
All estimations are based on the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Bank fixed effects are not reported. 
 
Table 3b) Cyclicality of the components of the capit l ratios /Cycle variable = Credit 
Gap 
Dependent 
variable L (t)  
  
Tier 1 (growth) 
Leverage Exposure 
(growth) 
Total Assets (growth) 
Risk Weighted 
Assets (growth) 
Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err 
 L (t-1) 0,9301*** 0,0142 0,9581*** 0,0099 0,9596*** 0,0104 0,9816*** 0,0077 
 L (t-1)*C 0,9863*** 0,0184 0,1234** 0,0156 0,1268*** 0,0150 0,1757*** 0,0158 
Y (t) = Credit 
Gap 
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Dependent 
variable L (t)  
  
Tier 1 (growth) Leverage Exposure 
(growth) 
Total Assets (growth) Risk Weighted 
Assets (growth) 
Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err 
Y (t)*C 0,0022*** 0,0013 0,0639*** 0,0010 0,0639*** 0,0010 0,0637*** 0,0011 
C -0,0238** 0,0106 -0,0262*** 0,0055 -0,0253*** 0,0057 -0,0430*** 0,0039 
Constant 0,0752 0,0671 0,1701*** 0,0582 0,1309** 0,0612 -0,0159 0,0392 
All estimations are based on the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Bank fixed effects are not reported. 
 
Table 4a) Cyclicality of the components of the leverage exposure/Cycle variable = 
Real GDP growth 
Dependent variable 















Coeff. Std. err 
 L (t-1) + 0,9307*** 0,0237 0,5738*** 0,0808 0,9337*** 0,0152 
 L (t-1)*C + 1,0443*** 0,0237 0,6211*** 0,0720 0,3263*** 0,0270 
Y (t) = Real GDP 
growth 
+ -0,5781 4,3938 -0,6044 10,1702 1,8183 0,8105 
Y (t)*C + 2,9027 6,9578 5,4852 11,3075 -0,6236 2,5268 
C  -0,0147 0,1062 0,1414 0,5878 0,0197 0,0165 
Constant  0,0876 0,2183 3,2089*** 0,9444 0,5011*** 0,1040 
All estimations are based on the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Bank fixed effects are not reported. 
 
Table 4b) Cyclicality of the components of the leverage exposure/Cycle variable = 
Credit Gap 
Dependent variable 













err Coeff. Std. err 
 L (t-1) + 0,9349*** 0,0237 0,5447*** 0,0799 0,9309*** 0,0153 
 L (t-1)*C + 1,0532*** 0,0281 0,4649*** 0,0895 0,3944*** 0,0341 
Y (t) = Credit Gap + 0,0209*** 0,0081 0,0466* 0,0257 0,0007 0,0009 
Y (t)*C + 0,0043 0,0028 0,0355*** 0,0054 0,0381*** 0,0018 




1,1509 -3,1288 3,6159 0,4001*** 0,1487 
All estimations are based on the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator. ***, **, * indicate 
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ANNEX II: Data sample and the estimate of the Leverage Ratio exposure measure 
 
A. Data availability and source 
Individual bank data from the supervisory reports to the Banco de Portugal was used in 
the empirical estimates; hence this data is confidet al. In the most recent periods all the 
variables are available with quarterly frequency, nevertheless in the beginning of the 
period some of the variables are only available annu lly or semi-annually and quarterly 
data was obtained using linear interpolation. Table 5 depicts the availability of data on a 
bank basis.  
It should also be stressed that the introduction of the IFRS did not cause a major time 
series break in what regards data used in this study, since the precious regime stipulated 
analogous rules regarding, inter alia, netting of exposures. Furthermore, Banco de 
Portugal has kept long time series of comparable data for the major banking groups, 
which are used in this work. 
Nominal and real GDP are official statistics from the national statistics institute (INE), 
seasonally adjusted. 
The credit gap regards one-sided (real-time) long-term trend deviations of total credit to 
non-financial private sectors vis-à-vis nominal GDP and was obtained from Banco de 
Portugal internal estimates, in line with the Basel III guidelines for the countercyclical 
capital buffer. Trends are calculated using a one-sid d Hodrick-Prescott filter with a 
smoothing factor lambda of 400,000, taking account only of information up to each 






Is the Basel III leverage ratio countercyclical? 
A study for Portuguese banks 
Table 5 Data availability per banking group 
 






2000Q4-2008Q4: Semi-annual data 
2009Q1-2014Q1: Quarterly data Risk Weighted 
Assets 
Total Assets 





























2000Q4-2014Q1: Quarterly data 
 
B. Estimating the Leverage Ratio Exposure 
The present definition of the leverage ratio exposure, which is tested in this work, was 
only introduced in January 2014, hence only 3 QIS exercises include comparable data 
(the description of the LR exposure is in the final of section 2 of the main text). The 
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(2014) and essentially estimates the relationship between the balance sheet exposure of 
derivatives and SFT with the add-ons for, respectivly, potential future exposure (PFE) 
and counterparty credit risk and applies those coeffici nts to on-balance sheet exposure . 
Furthermore, in the case of derivatives, netting is not allowed, hence an additional 
coefficient for the relationship between balance shet values and leverage exposure is 
also calculated. 
The inclusion of off-balance sheet items (OBS) is one f the most striking features of 
the leverage ratio exposure, since recent history has proved that in moments of crisis 
off-balance exposure turns into on-balance. In the EU, OBS items will be included in 
the exposure of the leverage ratio via the use of the supervisory conversion factors in 
Annex I of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), according to the likelihood that 
those items have of being converted into on-balance she t items, ranging from 10% for 
cancellable commitments and 100% for full risk categories. The OBS considered are 
guarantees and commitments. 
Table 6 Coefficients used to estimate the leverage exposure 
Exposure 





































exposure \ ≤ 1 
37% 
                                                                        
15
 The expected value is negative because Portuguese banks use IFRS and are not allowed to net 
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